Riyadh is reported to be weighing military options against the Houthis, including a ground operation conducted by Yemeni government forces with Saudi air and logistical support, while simultaneously exploring de-escalation through Omani channels. The kingdom denies the talks and has not announced the operation. What follows is a set of observables that would distinguish preparation from signalling, ordered roughly by how early they appear.
Early indicators
- Salary payments and recruitment drives among Yemeni government brigades, particularly in Marib and Hadramout, after long periods of arrears.
- Movement of Saudi logistics assets, fuel bowsers, and field medical capability toward Sharurah and the Wadiah crossing.
- Repair or expansion of airstrips in the eastern governorates, visible in commercial imagery.
- A shift in Saudi strikes from coastal and naval targets at Hodeidah and Kamaran toward inland command, air defence, and missile storage sites.
- Reconciliation efforts with the Southern Transitional Council, whose forces cannot be excluded from a serious ground campaign after their expulsion from the Presidential Leadership Council in January.
Mid-stage indicators
- Formation-level movement rather than fires, meaning identifiable brigades relocating with their support elements.
- Contracting activity for airlift, sealift, and third-country security personnel.
- Evacuation advisories or drawdowns at diplomatic facilities in Aden and Riyadh’s southern provinces.
- A change in the legal framing of Saudi statements, from protection of shipping and self-defence toward restoration of legitimate government authority.
- Suspension or public collapse of the Omani mediation track, which Riyadh currently denies exists and would therefore end without announcement.
Late indicators
- Sustained suppression of enemy air defences over the north, which no ground advance can proceed without.
- Notices to airmen and mariners closing corridors along the Saudi-Yemeni border and the southern Red Sea.
- Interdiction of Houthi resupply lines from the coast inland, indicating an intent to isolate rather than to punish.
Counter-indicators
Several developments would argue against an imminent campaign. A resumption of Yemeni government salary payments without accompanying force movement suggests stabilisation rather than mobilisation. Public Saudi acknowledgement of Omani mediation would signal that the diplomatic track has been chosen, since Riyadh gains nothing from admitting talks it intends to abandon. Continued Houthi missile fire into Saudi territory without proportionate Saudi retaliation indicates that the kingdom is absorbing costs to protect a negotiation.
Base assessment
The forces available to the anti-Houthi side are less capable and less unified than in 2015, the Emirati contribution is gone, and the Houthis have more range and depth than they did then. A ground campaign under those conditions is a high-risk undertaking whose most likely outcome is a stalemate at greater cost. That argues for the mediation track as the base case, with military preparation used to give it weight. The scenario that would overturn this is a Houthi move on Marib, which would force a Saudi response regardless of what Riyadh would prefer to do.